AUSTRIA’S
imperial designs were extinguished by the outcome of the Great War. Italy’s,
however, burned more brightly than ever. In an article in “Foreign Affair”s of June 15, 1923, Mr. Francesco
Coppola says:
“Although
Italy entered the war to combat the German attempt at hegemony and to wrest her
historic frontiers and the control of the Adriatic from Austria, Italy’s
traditional instinct really aimed to secure the indispensable modicum of
security and freedom for expansion. It was for this reason that in the
fundamental pact of alliance—the Treaty of London of April, 1915—Baron Sonnino
stipulated for Italian colonial compensation in Africa in the event of a
Franco-English partition of the German colonies, and for a corresponding zone in
Southern Anatolia in the event of Allied acquisitions in the Levant. It was also
for this reason that, later on, when he got wind of the complete plan of a
tripartite division of the Ottoman Empire, (disloyally concluded in 1916 between
France, Russia, and England without the knowledge of Italy, who had been
fighting for more than a year by their side), he forced the Allies to reopen the
question and to give an adequate share to Italy. The new treaty was discussed in
April, 1917, between Sounino, Ribot and Lloyd George at St. Jean de Maurienne— from which it took its
name—and was concluded and signed in London in August of the same year. While
leaving Constantinople and the Caucasus, Armenia and part of the Anatolian coast
of the Black Sea to Russia, Syria and Cilicia to France, and Mesopotamia and the
protectorate over Arabia to England, this treaty
assigned to Italy Southwestern Anatolia, the whole vilayet of Aidin with Smyrna,
the whole vilayet of Konia with Adalia and a small part of the vilayet of Adana.
But this very treaty contained the poison which was later to weaken it. Even
before the war was over, the Allies hastened to avail themselves of the
pretext of the absence of Russia’s signature to denounce the Treaty of St. Jean
de Maurienne. Thus it came about that in the spring of 1919, Lloyd George,
taking advantage of the weakness and temporary absence of Orlando, and violating
the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne and the armistice of Mudros, was able to
arrange that Smyrna and the surrounding neighborhood be given to Greece. This
was done with the full consent of Wilson, who, absolutely ignorant of European
and Mediterranean affairs, blindly allowed himself to be governed by idealistic
impulses and natural prejudices and with the approbation of Clemenceau, who was
only too delighted to be able to ‘jouer un mauvais tour a l’ Italie.’
”
Some
of the Italian publicist’s conclusions are open to discussion, but his article
sets forth the Italian frame of mind. There was much talk at Smyrna during the
time of the Greek occupation in military circles and among the Levantines about
Italian efforts to build a port farther to the south, in the vicinity of ancient
Ephesus, that would become the chief harbor of Asia Minor and leave Smyrna to
sink into insignificance. Many stories were told also of Italian efforts
to win the affections of the Turk. In any case, it is certain that
bands of Turkish marauders were in the habit of crossing the line from the
Italian zone and of attacking and killing Greeks, after which they would take
refuge with the Italians, where they could not be
pursued.
The
statement that the Turks received munitions and many arms from Italian shippers
was persistently repeated, and has never been successfully refuted.
The Italian viewpoint has already been explained. They considered that Smyrna
had been promised them and that the Hellenic forces had been hurried there by
their unfaithful allies to forestall their own landing. Italy can consider
herself very fortunate that she did not beat the Greeks to Smyrna, for even with
her own resources, so superior to those of King Constantine, she would have had
her hands full.
But,
the point is, her attitude contributed to the Greek defeat, the burning of
Smyrna and the final destruction of the Christians of Asia Minor.
Much valuable Italian property was destroyed as well as that of others. An
aftermath of Italian antipathy to Greece may be seen in the bombardment of Corfu
and the seizure of the island by the Italian fleet on August 31,
1923.
On
the twenty-seventh of the same month, five Italian members of the commission for
the delimitation of the frontier between Albania and Greece were waylaid on a
lonely road in Albania and foully murdered by unknown persons. The demands of
the Italian Government, including a payment of fifty million liras, were refused
by the Greeks, on the ground that culpability had not been established. A
request by Greece that the affair be referred to the League of Nations was
refused and the island bombarded, with the result that sixty-five civilians,
largely refugees, were killed or wounded. The indignation of the Italians
is easily understandable, but a knowledge of preceding events is necessary to
explain the wholly unnecessary bombardment of a Greek island on insufficient
data and the killing or the wounding of sixty-five entirely innocent persons. As
these latter were killed by cannon, they were not, of course,
murdered.
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